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COMMENTS
The Biased Expert Witness in Louisiana Tort Law: Existing
Mechanisms of Control and Proposals for Change
I. INTRODUCTION
In a particularly colorful closing address, a lawyer once offered a jury the
following insight:
We [lawyers] have our own way of talking about witnesses. And one thing
that we very often say and talk about is the three classes of liars. There is
the plain liar, the damn liar, and the expert witness. And of all of them,
the expert witness is the worst.'
While this characterization of the expert witness can be dismissed as theatrical,2 it
nevertheless has an echo of credibility today that it may not have enjoyed 60 years
ago when it was delivered. In the intervening years, courts and commentators have
witnessed the rise of "professional" experts who confer with attorneys and testify
at trials with such frequency that they derive a significant portion of their income
from providing these services.3
Because the "universe of experts is defined only by the virtually infinite variety
of fact questions in the trial courts,"4 the ranks of professional experts are ever
increasing. This proliferation has resulted in the creation of the expert-advocate
who, lured by the prospect of a substantial fee, testifies in conformity with the needs
of the principal who engages him.5 The natural tendency of parties with interests
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEW.
I. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,266, 60 S. Ct. 81I, 864 (1940)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting counsel for the United States).
2. In fact, in response to an objection and a request that the jury be directed to disregard the
statement, the trial court ruled: .'The jury may disregard it. I didn't hear it. I was thinking about
something else.' Id. at 267, 60 S. Ct. at 864. A majority of the Court found that this instruction
"cured the error if it could be considered such." Id. at 243, 60 S. Ct. at 853.
3. Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 Yale L & Pol'y Rev. 480, 483 (1988).
4. Eymard v. Pan Am.World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
5. Throughout this comment, the terms "expert-advocate" and "biased expert witness" appear
interchangeably. It is not the author's intention to burden all persons who provide expert testimony in
court with these characterizations. These terms refer, instead, to a growing contingent among the ranks
of professional experts. See supra text accompanying note 3. In the author's view, the following
passage describes this contingent with alarming accuracy:
[The expert-advocate] works alone, or in partnership with a handful of others. He
advertises. His clients gradually learn that they can't risk going without him, for the
opposition will surely hirehis mirror-image clone from the other referral agency. He is
"neat but not dapper; respectable but not pompous; mature but not senile." He is cautious
about putting things in writing, far more comfortable when working strictly with his mouth.
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adverse to those of the principal has been to counter testimony perceived as biased
with "hired guns" of their own. The result is a "battle of the experts" in which
outcomes at trial are all too often dependent on which party's expert has the greatest
impact on the jury.6 As proclaimed by a former president of the American Bar
Association, "I would go into a lawsuit with an objective, uncommitted,
independent expert about as willingly as I would occupy a foxhole with a couple of
noncombatant soldiers."7
While the present concern over biased expert testimony is well placed, it must
nevertheless be acknowledged that the marketability of expert testimony is directly
influenced by the needs of litigation and by admissibility standards.' Put simply,
expert testimony is often essential.9 Cases in the areas of toxic tort and products
liability have risen to such a level of scientific and technological complexity that
triers of fact have come to rely on expert testimony both to understand difficult facts
and to determine what inferences can correctly and comfortably be drawn from
those facts.'" This reliance is by no means limited to the cases that garner headlines.
In even the most common personal injury actions, medical experts explain injuries,
economists quantify damages and engineers reconstruct accident scenes." To
ensure the availability of such testimony, it is admissible in court if it will "assist the
trier 'of fact."" To further encourage the participation of experts in the judicial
process, courts traditionally afford the expert witness absolute immunity from a
He sees himself as a team player, who helps with trial preparation, assists in the examination
of opposing witnesses, advises on new areas of inquiry. He works consistently for one side
(insurance companies) or the other (plaintiffs' lawyers).... He can earn hundreds of dollars
an hour, hundreds of thousands a year. For all practical purposes, he is working on a
contingency fee, though the contingent nature of his employment and compensation will
always be angrily denied. Where have we seen this character before? In his employer's
office. He is the spit and image of a trial lawyer.
Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 19-20 (1991) (citations omitted).
6. By 1975,problems associated with the "battle of the experts" had become widespread enough
to attract the attention of the Advisory Committee to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lee,
supra note 3, at 483. See Fed. R. Evid. 706 advisory committee's notes ("The practice of shopping for
experts, the venality of some experts, and the reluctance of many reputable experts to involve
themselves in litigation, have been matters of deep concern."). Rule 706 codified the common lawright
of courts to appoint experts to testify. See infra Part V.A.
7. Blake Fleetwood, From the People Who Brought You the Twinkie Defense: The Rise of the
Expert Witness Industry, Wash. Monthly, June 1987, at 33 (quoting former American Bar Association
president John C. Shephard).
8. Jeffrey S. Parker, Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court, the Economics of Scientific
Evidence, and the Adversarial System, 4 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 30 (1995).
9. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's notes.
10. Frank L. Maraist, Evidence and Proof § 11.3, at 197, in 19 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1999).
11. See, e.g., Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212 (111. 1984) (discussing the role of the
expert medical witness in personal injury litigation); Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d
1230,1235 (5th Cir. 1986) (criticizing economist for abusing "known facts" to inflate damage awards);
Wehbe v. Waguespack, 720 So. 2d 1267,1275 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998) (findingthatthe trial judgewas
properly skeptical as to the value of the accident reconstructionist's testimony).
12. La. Code Evid. art. 702.
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defamation action based upon his in-court statements." This protection from
liability reflects the historical view that witnesses are "friends of the court" who
come forward to "assist in the attempt to achieve justice."'" However, the modem
expert-advocate has challenged, if not obliterated, this amicable view and
necessitated an increase in appellate supervision of trial court decisions on the
admissibility of expert testimony."
Tort law has provided the landscape upon which recent battles over the
admissibility of expert testimony have been fought.' Of primary concern has
been the protection of parties from biased or "suspect" expert testimony. For
the benefit of comparison with national developments, as well as to avoid
the constitutional issues raised by expert testimony in the criminal arena, this
comment examines issues surrounding the biased expert witness in Louisiana tort
law and, more specifically, the protections afforded litigants under the law and by
the courts.
Part II will discuss the challenges the expert witness presents to the jury
system. Part HI will address existing methods of controlling biased expert
testimony. Part IV will assess the effectiveness of existing safeguards, while
Part V will consider two current proposals for correcting abuses. The
comment will conclude with a determination that heightened vigilance on the
part of trial judges and a modification in the testimonial immunity of the expert
witness are the best solutions to the problems presented by the biased expert
witness.
II. THE EXPERT WrrNESS AND THE JURY
In the modem adversarial system, the jury is "ideally both an unbiased and an
uninformed fact-finding body whose members ... give their verdict solely on the
basis of the evidence presented at trial."'7 For a variety of reasons, expert testimony
challenges the traditionally celebrated ability of layjurors to sift through opposing
arguments and bring a fair resolution to a controversy.
First, expert testimony differs significantly from lay testimony with respect to
both substance and form. Under the Louisiana Code of Evidence, a lay witness may
testify only as to matters within his "personal knowledge."" The personal
13. See infra Part V.B.1.
14. Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming "Hired Guns," 31 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 497 (1996). See also Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-9 (i 981) ("The
roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue
the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state facts objectively.").
15. See generally Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.3, at 199-200.
16. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993); Kurnho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
17. Parker, supra note 8, at 10.
18. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 602 provides, in pertinent part: "A witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal
knowledge of the matter." The article is subject to the provisions of Louisiana Code of Evidence article
703. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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knowledge rule is clearly consistent with the modem institutional arrangement,
wherein jurors form opinions, while witnesses provide the facts. 9 Thus, opinion
testimony by lay witnesses generally is excluded from evidence as irrelevant or
incompetent.2" Expert testimony, on the other hand, is admissible in the form of an
opinion." In further contrast with the lay witness, the expert may base his
testimony on matters not within his personal knowledge.' This wide latitude not
only makes it easier for experts to qualify to give testimony, but also equips them
with tremendous power to influence a jury.'
Second, because the expert testifies to matters beyond the knowledge of the
jury, the jury is ill-equipped to meaningfully evaluate the merit of the expert's
opinion.24 Therefore, as one commentator has observed, "there is a great tendency,
or at least a temptation, for the trier of fact to take the expert's recitation of facts
and opinions as truth and adopt those recitations as its own."'
The tendency of jurors to abdicate their ultimate duties can be attributed, at
least in part, to the "apparent objectivity" of the polished expert witness. 6
However, within the context of the "battle of the experts," jurors are frequently left
to choose between two contending experts whose opinions seem equally plausible
or "objective." 7 When jurors are faced with this situation, they are likely to resort
19. Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.1, at 193. See also Parker, supra note8, at 11-12.
20. Exceptions to the general rule against admission of lay opinion testimony flow from
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 701 (a witness may provide an opinion if it is (1) rationally based
upon the perception of the witness, and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony). See
generally Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.2, at 194-96.
21. La. Code Evid. art. 702. The opinion advanced by the expert "is not to be excluded solely
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." La. Code Evid. art. 704.
22. La. Code Evid. art. 703 cmt. (c). In fact, rarely will the expert have personal knowledge of
the facts that form the basis of the opinion. Furthermore, "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence." La. Code Evid. art. 703.
23. In a 1993 survey conducted by the National Law Journal and Lexis/Nexis, nearly 800 people
who served on criminal and civil juries responded to more than 100 questions concerning the legal
system. Of those surveyed, eighty-nine percent felt that paid experts were believable. Seventy-one
percent of the jurors said the experts made a difference in the verdict. Furthermore, over fifty-eight
percent of those surveyed thought the experts were unbiased. Eric G. Jensen, Comment, When "Hired
Guns "Backfire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L Rev.
185, 188 (1993) (citing Joan M. Cheever & Joanne Naiman, The View from the Jury Box, Nat'l L. J.,
Feb. 22, 1993, at S4).
24. Linda S. Simard & WilliamG. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role oftheDistrict Judge
in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 Tul. L Rev. 1457,1460 (1994). See also Learned Hand, Historical
and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L Rev. 40, 51-55 (1901).
25. Christopher M. McDowell, Note, Authorising the Expert Witness to Assassinate Character
for Profit: A Reexamination of the Testimonial Immunity of the Expert Witness, 28 U. Mer. L Rev.
239, 264 (1997). See also Hand, supra note 24 , at 52 ("Now the important thing and the only
important thing to notice is that the expert has taken the jury's place if they believe him.").
26. Simard & Young, supra note 24, at 1460.
27. As Judge Learned Hand once observed:
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide, where doctors disagree. The
whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, as we have seen, but general truths
derived from his specialized experience. But how can the jury judge between two
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to the same criteria they employ in assessing the credibility of lay witnesses.2"
Thus, considerations of demeanor, personality, appearance and communication
skills will determine not only which opinion is accepted, but often the outcome of
the litigation."
Finally, unlike lay witnesses, the expert receives a fee for preparation and
testimony provided in court." In and of itself, the compensation of the expert
merely reflects that the time spent preparing for or testifying in court is time spent
away from the expert's customary professional endeavors. However, lawyers today
are keenly aware that an expert's showmanship may be at least as important as the
substance of his testimony." This awareness has generated a profitable market for
the services of the expert-advocate, as lawyers jockey for the "best" expert
possible.32 The product contemplated in this market is not the independent exercise
of professional judgment, but rather charismatic testimony to a pre-ordained
conclusion.3 Lawyers, then, have used their ability to compensate expert witnesses
to integrate them into the litigation team'M An expert who does not advance the
interests of the team through his testimony is not likely to be retained again."
Consequently, many experts who testify in courts today have a financial stake in the
outcome of the litigation, which inevitably results in a decrease in the reliability of
their testimony.3 6
statements each founded upon an experience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It
is just because they are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at all.
Hand, supra note 24, at 54.
28. Richard H. Underwood, "X-Spurt" Witnesses, 19 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 343,374 (1995). See
Pendleton v. Barrett, 706 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997) (trial court should evaluate expert
testimonyby the same rules which are applicable to other witnesses); Lopez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
700 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997) (trier of fact may evaluate expert testimony by the same
principles as apply to other witnesses, and has great discretion to accept or reject expert opinions). See
also Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 666 So. 2d 1073, 1077 (La. 1996) (i[W]here the
testimony of expert witnesses differ, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine which
evidence is most credible.").
29. See Douglas R. Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L Rev. 485,487 (1997).
See also Hand, supra note 24, at 52 n. 1.
30. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b) cmt. 3 (1998) (stating that in most
jurisdictions it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee).
31. See Underwood, supra note 28, at 374 n.165.
32. Jensen, supra note 23, at 188. See also Fleetwood, supra note 7 (discussing advertisements
of expert services in various mediums, some of which go so far as to boast of bringing in the "highest
verdicts").
33. Professor lmwinkelried states that leading contemporary commentators are "not merely
alleging that financial interest biases experts at a subconscious level; they go further and aver outright
fraud and perjury." Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as
to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 1069, 1089 (1992) (quoted in
McDowell, supra note 25, at 272).
34. See supra note 5. -See also Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1233 (5th
Cir. 1986) ('[Tlrial courts must be wary lest the expert become nothing more than an advocate of policy
before thejury. Stated more directly, the trial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the
jury more than the lawyers can offer in argument.").
35. See supra note 5.
36. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L Rev. 1 113,1178 (1991) (arguing that.
2000]
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The challenges presented by the biased expert to the jury system are "not
merely of academic or hypothetical concern.""' For most litigants, "the only day in
court of consequence is the one spent at the trial court level.... ."" This is so
because an appellate court may not set aside a trial court's or ajury's finding of fact
in the absence of "manifest error" or unless it is "clearly wrong." 9 Litigants, then,
are "occasionally justified in their concern that a well-heeled party can obtain its
version ofjustice at the trial court simply by retaining an arsenal of 'hired guns' to
prove its case, particularly in the context of a jury trial, then rest on the [manifest
error] line of defense."'0 The rise to prominence of biased experts and the danger
that their testimony will carry "undue weight" with a jury demand the attention of
the courts.4 As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
in Eymard v. Pan American World Airways:
2
[T]he professional expert is now commonplace. That a person
spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and
testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions are
available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law,
before ajury, and with the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he
is an "expert."',
3
If an expert whose testimony is available at a price has no place in a court of
law, then the inquiry properly shifts to the institutional protections which may be
employed to keep such testimony beyond the hearing of the jury.
if expert testimony was disseminated among relevant peer groups, expert witnesses would feel greater
pressure "to be careful as well as honest").
37. Frederick v. Woman's Hosp. of Acadiana, 626 So. 2d 467,472 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ
denied, 633 So. 2d 169 (1994).
38. Id.
39. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). See also Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.
2d 1330, 1333 (La. 1978); Canter v. Koehring, 283 So. 2d 716, 724 (La. 1973).
40. Frederick, 626 So. 2d at 473. The court's concern with abuse of the system by "well-heeled"
parties begs the question of whether the "battle of the experts" represents a best-case scenario. The
common disparity in wealth among tort litigants implies unequal access to expert testimony. Some
commentators argue that this implication is unwarranted in light of the contingent fee, at least where
the "poor" party is the plaintiff. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 8, at 33 n.95. However, while the
contingent fee arrangement is an effective mechanism for financing "slam-dunk" cases, in closer
disputes the interests of the litigant and the interests of his lawyer, who risks the loss of money invested
in the case, may conflict. It is therefore possible, even under a contingent fee arrangement, for a party
to lack the resources necessary to rebut the expert testimony advanced by his adversary. As a matter
of societal policy, this is acceptable so long as the adversary's expert delivers a reliable opinion, for the
litigant's claim may have no merit. But if trial judges do not exert sufficient quality control on expert
testimony, the concerns articulated by the Frederick court may materialize to defeat a valid claim. See
infra Part M.A. See also Wehbe v. Waguespack, 720 So. 2d 1267, 1273-74 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1998)
(discussing the "great discretion" afforded the trial court in its assessment 6fexpert witness fees against
the party cast in judgment).
41. Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 718,725 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
673 So. 2d 611 (1996).
42. 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 1233.
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m. EXIsTING METHODS OF CONTROL
A. Judicial Oversight
1. Standards for Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is an inquiry committed
to the "broad discretion" of the trial court." Article 104(A) of the Louisiana Code
of Evidence assigns to trial judges the duty of resolving "preliminary questions
concerning the competency or qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence... ."' Implicit in this
directive is the requirement that parties seeking to challenge expert testimony do so
prior to its admission." Depending on the complexity of the case or the importance
of the proffered testimony, courts may prefer to entertain such challenges well
before trial.4 7
44. La. Code Evid. art. 702 cnt. (d). See, e.g., Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d 322 (1996) (stating that a trial judge's decision to qualify an expert
witness will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous).
45. La. Code Evid. art. 104(A). See also Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
46. A party may waive objection to an expertes qualifications or his methodology by failing to
raise the issue at trial. See, e.g., Bryant v. Tidy Bldg. Servs., 678 So. 2d 48 (La. App. 4th Cit.), writ
denied, 683 So. 2d 273 (1996). For an outline of the procedures for presenting expert testimony, see
J. Michael Veron, The Trial of Toxic Torts: Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert, 57 La. L Rev.
647, 657 (1997).
47. A party may file a motion in limine to obtain a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. See, e.g., Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 673 So. 2d 611 (1996). Whether to hear such a motion is generally left to the discretion of the
trial judge. See Maraist, supra note 10, § 2.7, at 23. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1551.
Because summryjudgment procedure is now "favored," Louisiana courts are currently being asked
to determine the admissibility of expert testimony at that stage of litigation. In his concurring opinion
in Simmons v. Berry, 748 So. 2d 473, 481 (La. App. I st Cir. 1999), Judge Gonzales advised that "[trial
lawyers need to be made aware that the possibility of exclusion of expert testimony looms down the
road and thus should make their... challenges during the course of the deposition." The Simmons
court held that deposition testimony of an expert is admissible in support of a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 477. However, the court also held that the affidavit of a doctor, which was based upon
a review of the plaintiff's medical records rather than "personal knowledge" as required by Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 967, was not properly before the trial court on a motion for summary
judgment. Id. The Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently confronted this curious distinction
between depositions and affidavits. In Independent Fire Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 755 So. 2d
226, 235 (La. 2000), the court pointed out that Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967 was
enacted in 1960, "well before the proliferation of expert opinion evidence on summary judgment."
Thus, the court found it "doubtful that the redactors of the Code had experts in mind when they used
the term 'personal knowledge."' Id. (quoting Frank L Maraist & Harry T. Lemmon, Civil Procedure
§ 6.8, at 144, in I Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1999)). The court therefore held that:
Article 967 of the Louisiana Rules [sic] of Civil Procedure does not preclude from
consideration expert opinion testimony in the form of an affidavit or deposition submitted
in support of or opposition to a motion for sunimary judgment. Assuming no credibility
determination is at issue, the trial judge must consider this evidence if he or she determines
2000]'
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In making the preliminary assessment, the judge must look to Article 702,
which provides the general standard governing expert testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."'
Whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact is the key criterion established
by the article.49 The court properly excludes expert testimony as unnecessary if it
relates to matters within the knowledge or understanding of the average layman."
Furthermore, testimony is not helpful to the trier of fact unless the witness's claimed
expertise is sufficiently definite."' Upon establishing the area of expertise, the
witness may still be precluded under the article from testifying on subjects beyond
the scope of that expertise.5 2 Significantly, experience alone may provide an
adequate basis for qualification as an expert."
In practice, the "broad discretion" afforded trial judges in interpreting the
rather liberal "helpfulness" standard set forth in Article 702 resulted in few tendered
experts being rejected.' In response to this laxity in policing expert opinions,
that such evidence would be admissible at trial.
Independent Fire, 755 So. 2d at 237. The supreme court later granted the Simmons plaintiff's writ
application and remanded the case to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Independent
Fire. Simmons v. Berry, 760 So. 2d 1186 (La. 2000).
48. La. Code Evid. art. 702. See Mitchell v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 666 So. 2d 727 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 421 (1996) (Louisiana rule governing admissibility of
expert testimony is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and Louisiana jurisprudence on
admissibility generally follows federal interpretation).
49. See, e.g., Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), writ denied, 666 So. 2d
322 (1996) (finding that expert testimony regarding use of deadly force would not assist trier of fact in
determining whether homeowner's act of shooting an inadvertent trespasser on his property was
reasonable). See also La. Code Evid. art. 702 cmt. (a).
50. See, e.g., Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 516 So. 2d 452 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1987)
(inference that falling briefcase caused injury when it struck passenger on the head); Bob v. McDermott
Corp., 476 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985) (determination of whether plaintiff was a malingerer);
Bechtel v. Entringer Bakeries, Inc., 422 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982) (building code violations).
See also Foster v. Trafalgar House Oil & Gas, 603 So. 2d 284, 286 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) (holding
that an economist could not testify as to quantification of general damages, including "hedonic
damages"; such testimony would "imply certainty in an area where none exists" and "improperly invade
the province of the jury").
51. See, e.g., Reilly v. Dynamic Exploration, Inc., 558 So. 2d 1249, 1251 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1990) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to qualify as an expert a
witness whose claimed expertise was "safety in just everything").
52. See, e.g., Standeford v. Winn Dixie of Louisiana, Inc., 688 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1996) (neurologist not qualified to testify about mechanics allegedly involved in accident; such
testimony was beyond his expertise); Shaw v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1991) (finding that even if house painter's son was an expert in house painting, he was not an expert
in accident reconstruction and could not give expert opinion testimony about what caused house
painter's ladder to slip).
53. Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 666 So. 2d 1073, 1079 (La. 1996).
54. Veron, supra note 46, at 657.
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appellate courts began to provide further guidance for trial judges in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony under Article 702. Three Louisiana Courts of
Appeal adopted the standards for admissibility set forth by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp." The
factors established by the court include:
(1) whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion,;'
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are
relied upon by other experts in the field.
57
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used well-founded
methodology,5" and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony passes these tests, whether the
testimony's potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value under the relevant rules.59
The first three inquiries are properly understood as "threshold requirements that all
expert testimony must meet before being deemed admissible." ° The fourth inquiry,
which invokes the Article 403 balancing test, functions as "an overlay-a final
mechanism for screening out otherwise admissible testimony whose potential for
prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value."'
Article 403, while applicable to all evidence, provides trial judges with an
especially powerful tool for regulating expert testimony. In performing the Article
403 balancing test, courts may consider issues that were properly excluded from the
narrower threshold inquiries.62 For example, in Frederick v. Woman's Hospital of
Acadiana,6" the court was asked to determine the point at which a "parade of expert
55. 939 F.2d 1106,1110(5thCir. 1991),cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912,112S. Ct 1280(1992).
The fourth circuit adopted the Christophersen standard in Adams v. Chevron, 589 So. 2d 1219, 1223
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 415 (1992). The second and third circuits followed
the Christophersen and Adams reasoning in, respectively, State v. Hill, 601 So. 2d 684, 692 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 192 (1992) and Glankler v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 610 So. 2d 1020,
1027 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 78 (1993).
56. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 110. The first factor derives from Federal Rule of Evidence
702. See supra note 48.
57. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110. The second factor invokes Federal Rule of Evidence 703.
For commentary on the virtually identical Louisiana Code of Evidence article 703, see George W. Pugh
et al., Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law 445-47 (1999). See also Laura 0. Wingate, Conmt,
Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 703: Is It a Hidden Exception to the Hearsay Rule?, 53 La. L.
Rev. 1605 (1993).
58. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110. At the time of its pronouncement in this case, the Fifth
Circuit employed the Frye general acceptance standard to resolve challenges to an expert's
methodology. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
59. Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110.
60. Id.
61. Id. Louisiana Code of Evidence article 403, which generally follows Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time."
62. Christophersen 939 F.2d at 1111.
63. 626 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 633 So. 2d 169 (1994).
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witnesses" called by the defendant "becomes counterproductive to the
necessary twin goals of fairness and judicial economy."" The plaintiffs,
appealing a jury verdict absolving the defendant doctor and hospital of any
liability for serious injuries suffered by their minor daughter prior to birth,
assigned as error the trial judge's refusal to limit cumulative expert
evidence.6 The trial judge permitted two pediatric neurologists and three
obstetrician-gynecologists to testify favorably as to the standard of care
practiced by the defendant physician.' The plaintiffs conceded, however, that the
challenged testimony satisfied the 'threshold inquiries of the Christophersen
analysis. 7 The court was therefore left to decide whether the probative value of the
cumulative testimony was substantially outweighed by any of the concerns
articulated in Article 403.
In finding that the trial judge did not abuse his "great discretion" in admitting
the cumulative testimony, the court recognized that "a party has a fundamental right
to elicit the medical expert testimony of one witness on any point of significance to
resolution of the issues presented and probably a second witness as well, for added
perspective." As to whether subsequent experts should be permitted to testify, the
court found that several factors should be included in the Article 403 balance,
among them:
the background and testimonial nature of the witnesses; whether the trier
of fact is a jury or a judge; whether either of the parties litigant is a pauper
whose lack of means would otherwise result in a lack of due process; the
amount in controversy; [and] the costs in time and money which would
attend inclusion of the cumulative testimony .... 69
These and other factors are properly considered by the trial judge in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony challenged as biased. Thus, assuming the witness
is qualified, that his testimony has the appropriate basis in fact, and that the
methodology employed is well-founded, an expert's long history of partiality could
render his testimony unreasonably prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible, under
Article 403.70
2. The Impact of Daubert
The third inquiry of the Christophersen analysis concerns the expert's
methodology. For nearly 70 years, most American jurisdictions considered an
expert's opinion admissible if his methodology had achieved "general scientific
64. Id. at 470.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 472-73.
67. Id. at471.
68. Id. at 473.
69. Id.
70. Rowe v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 718,727 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
673 So. 2d 611 (1996).
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acceptance." This test, as formulated i nFryev. United States,7' essentially required
courts to "count the noses" of the expert's peers to determine general acceptance.72
The central criticism launched at this approach concerned its extension of "equal
dignity to the opinions of charlatans and Nobel Prize winners."" Following the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, some courts began rejecting
the much-debated standard, reasoning that helpfulness to the trier of fact does not
mandate general acceptance.74 Other courts, including the U.S. Fifth Circuit,
apparently relied on the silence of the Federal Rules as to the Frye standard in
continuing its application."
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the validity of the
Frye general acceptance standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.76 There, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not Frye,
provide the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony at trial, reasoning that
"a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust'
of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers
to "opinion" testimony.""' The Court was quick to point out, however, that the
"liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules did not displace all limits on the admissibility
of scientific evidence: "To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable." ' In performing this "gatekeeping" obligation, the judge must determine
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the proffered testimony is
scientifically valid and whether it can properly be applied to the facts in issue.79
71. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72. While Louisiana courts have frequently looked for general acceptance when considering
challenges to methodology, references to Frye in the jurisprudence are indeed scarce. See, e.g., State
v. Martin, 525 So. 2d 535 (La. App. 5th Cir. .1988) (where a trooper explained the method used in
calculating the defendant's speed, and the formulas used in the calculation were developed by the
nation's foremost authority on accident reconstruction, the court, without citing Frye, could find no
manifest abuse ofjudicial discretion in accepting the trooper as an expert in accident reconstruction).
In State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975 (La. 1979), the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected the general
acceptance standard of Frye as "an unjustified obstacle to the admission of polygraph test results." Id.
at 980. After conducting a balancing test that closely resembles the one required by present Code of
Evidence article 403, the court held that although not "universally accepted," polygraph evidence
should be admissible in post-trial proceedings. Id. at 981-82. However, polygraph evidence had not
reached a sufficient level of reliability to be held admissible at trial. Id.
Following the promulgation of the Code of Evidence in 1989, Louisiana courts began deferring
to interpretations of the similar Federal Rules. Thus, courts that adopted the Christophersen standards
for admissibility thereby employed the Frye test, despite the strong language of Catanese.
73. Huber, supra note 5, at 17 (quoting Edwin Donald Elliott of the Yale Law School).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1233-37 (3d Cir. 1985).
75. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 912, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
76. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
77. Id. at 588, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
78. Id. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
79. Id. at 592-93,113 S. Ct. at 2796. In assessing scientific validity, the judge should consider
(1) whether the theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested," (2) whether it has been "subjected
to peer review and publication," (3) the technique's "known or potential rate of enror" and the existence
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The Court's decision in Daubert was met with both praise and condemnation.
Louisiana quickly adopted the Daubert approach to admissibility in State v. Foret.0
Other states, viewing Daubert as a complex restatement of the Frye test, were less
inspired." As observed by Professor Maraist, the controversy over Daubert may
be grounded in a misunderstanding of its true impact:
Daubert did not introduce a new concept to evidence law. A judge
always is required to serve as a "gatekeeper" to expert testimony.
In most cases, however, the judge's knowledge and common sense equip
him or her adequately to the. task.... Daubert speaks to the cases in
which the judge's knowledge and common sense are inadequate to the
"gatekeeper" task.... [In such cases] the proponent should present
evidence to satisfy the judge that the proffered expert opinion is
sufficiently trustworthy.'"
Many courts in the wake of Daubert failed to interpret the case in such
a practical manner. While the discussion in Daubert was limited to
"scientific" expert testimony, the Court pointed out that Rule 702 also applies to
"technical, or other specialized knowledge.'" However, courts seeking to
mechanically apply the four Daubert factors to every case found the task difficult
when the testimony was not grounded in a "hard science" discipline." Although the
Court made it clear that the factors did not constitute a "definitive checklist," the
debate nevertheless surfaced as to whether Daubert should apply to nonscientific
testimony."
of "standards controlling the technique's operation," and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys
"general acceptance" in the relevant field. Id. at 593-94, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97. Courts and
commentators commonly refer to these inquiries as the "Daubert factors."
80. 628 So. 2d 1116(La. 1993).
81. See, e.g., Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 907 P.2d 923 (Kan. App. 1995). See also Daubert,
509 U.S. at 599-601, 113 S. Ct. at 2800 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting in part).
82. Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.3, at 203-04.
83. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.8.
84. See. e.g., Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (Dauberl
factors inapplicable where expert testimony based solely on expertise or training). Compare Berry v.
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995)
(Daubert factors applicable to opinion on proper police training).
85. This debate divided the U.S. Fifth Circuit. Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984
(5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert factors applicable to an expert's safety evaluation and alternative design
analysis where his work was grounded in his e'xperience and common engineering principles), with
Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert factors are, as a general rule,
inappropriate for assessing the reliability of expert clinical medical testimony). In his dissenting
opinion, occasioned by the court's en banc reversal of Moore, 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998), Judge
Dennis observed as follows:
This circuit now takes the position that a clinical medical expert, correctly using and
applying generally accepted clinical medical methodology, may not express an opinion as
to whether a particular chemical compound caused, aggravated, or contributed to a person's
disease or disorder unless that opinion is corroborated by hard scientific methodology that
passes muster under a rigid application of the Daubert factors.
Id. at 280 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael," the Supreme Court resolved this
debate in the affirmative, holding that the trial judge's general "gatekeeping"
obligation "applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also
to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge.""7 More
importantly, however, the Court emphatically maintained that the test for
evidentiary reliability is "flexible" and that "Daubert's list of specific factors
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case."88
Thus, the proper lesson for trial courts to take from Daubert and its progeny
is the importance of the gatekeeping function. 9 Because this basic obligation was
acknowledged rather than created by the Court in Daubert, the Christophersen
analysis remains valid for use by Louisiana judges." A judge should look to
Daubert for guidance only when his experience and common sense do not
adequately equip him to determine whether the methodology underlying an expert's
opinion is well-founded.9 Otherwise, the Code of Evidence provides judges with
the tools necessary to "make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon
professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
field."92
86. 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167(1999).
87. Id. at 141,119S. Ct at 1171.
88. Id.
89. In Caubarreaux v. El. duPont deNemours, 714 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), the court
concluded that when a party requests a preliminary Daubert hearing, the trial judge no longer has
discretion to deny the motion. Compare La. Code Civ. P. art. 1551. On rehearing, the court set aside
its original judgment in favor of a different remedy, but "reaffirm[ed] without comment" its decision
regarding a litigant's right to a preliminary Daubert hearing. Caubarreaux, 714 So. 2d at 73. The
Supreme Court of Louisiana denied a subsequent writ application, 728 So. 2d 868 (1998).
90. In a footnote to its opinion in Clement v. Griffin, 634 So. 2d 412,426 n.2 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writs denied, 637 So. 2d 478, 479 (1994), the fourth circuit court of appeal stated that the Louisiana
Supreme Court's adoption of the Daubert analysis overruled the circuit's previous adoption of the four-
part test established in Christophersen. However, neither Daubert nor Louisiana's adoption thereof
compels this finding. Daubert merely requires courts to replace the Frye stfndard originally associated
with the third inquiry of the Christophersen analysis with a more flexible assessment of an expert's
methodology, which includes, but is not limited to, a consideration of the four factors stated by the
Court. See supra note 79. Aside from this modification, Daubert is simply a restatement of the
Christophersen analysis. See Veron, supra note 46, at 661. The fourth circuit's subsequent return to
the Christophersen approach amplifies this point. See State v. Lewis, 654 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1995). See also Clay v. International Harvester Co., 674 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
91. See Willianson v. Haynes Best Western of Alexandria, 688 So. 2d 1201,1241 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1997) (holding that where the expert's field (detecting fraudulent claims) is not readily susceptible
of analysis under the Daubert factors, the trial court properly exercises its "gatekeeping" function by
limiting the expert to testimony based solely on the objective records of each of the claims it found
admissible, and by allowing full examination of the expert's qualifications before the jury); Young v.
Logue, 660 So. 2d 32, 50 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writs denied. 664 So. 2d 443,444 (1995) (finding that
the Daubert factors are not a "rigid, uncompromising test"; the trial judge retains discretion to admit
expert testimony he believes is relevant and reliable, even if the proposed testimony does not satisfy one
of the four factors).
92. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999).
2000]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
B. The Role of the Attorney
It is well settled that questions concerning the weight and credibility
of expert testimony are left to the trier of fact.93 Even uncontradicted
expert testimony is not binding on the court." As recognized by the
United States Supreme Court, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence." '
Of the three safeguards mentioned by the Court, cross-examination is
generally considered the most important mechanism for controlling expert
testimony. Though subject to the general rules applicable to all witnesses, courts
have traditionally afforded attorneys greater freedom in the cross-examination of
experts." The scope of cross-examination includes inquiry as to qualifications,
financial interest, bias, felony convictions, inconsistent statements, and the content
of learned treatises.' Furthermore, an expert may be cross-examined concerning
the bases for his opinion, regardless of whether they were disclosed on direct
examination."
Louisiana courts have acknowledged that cross-examination, "uncomple-
mented by other discovery methods, seldom is of adequate value when thrust
against the broadside of the litigation expert who can so gracefully stiff-arm
his unprepared cross-examiner." 9 Adverse parties, then, should generally be
permitted to discover records and other relevant information bearing on an
expert's "track record" in order to demonstrate an expert's alleged bias."
93. Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 666 So. 2d 1073, 1079 (La. 1996).
94. Sanders v. Wysocki, 631 So. 2d 1330,1334 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 637"So. 2d 156
(1994).
95. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798
(1993).96. See McDowell, supra note 25, at 272. See also Smith v. Scott, 577 So. 2d 809, $ 11 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991) ("The cross-examination of a witness at a civil trial is an essential part of our
adversarial system ofjustice.... Defendant cannot be expected to pay for his right to cross-examine
this [expert] witness.").
97. See generally Gross, supra note 36, at 1165-76. See La. Code Evid. art. 611(B) ("A witness
maybe cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility."). See also
La. Code Evid. art. 607 (general provision concerning attacks on witness credibility); La. Code Evid.
art. 608; La. Code Evid. art. 609 (contains guidelines for attacking credibility in civil cases through
evidence of criminal conviction); La. Code Evid. art. 613 (extrinsic evidence of bias, interest, or
corruption, prior inconsistent statements, conviction of crime, or defects of capacity is admissible for
the purpose of attacking credibility "after the proponent has first fairly directed the witness' attention
to the statement, act, or matter alleged, and the witness has been given the opportunity to admit the fact
and has failed distinctly to do so.").
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 803(18) governs the use of the content of learned treatises for
cross-examination purposes. See Pugh et al., supra note 57, at 510-1I.
98. La. Code Evid. art. 705(A).
99. Rowev. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 670 So. 2d 718,726 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
673 So. 2d 611 (1996).
100. But see Navarro v. Aries Marine Corp., 713 So. 2d 613, 616 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998) (stating
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But the scope of discovery for cross-examination purposes is not without
limits. As in most other areas of evidence law, the trial judge enjoys much
discretion in ensuring that witnesses are appropriately examined.'
In Louisiana civil cases, an expert's opinion is fully discoverable,
although the facts the expert knows are subject to some discovery
restrictions. " Thus, an attorney for an adverse party is typically familiar
with the expert testimony with which he must contend at trial and is
therefore in a position to present favorqble expert testimony in rebuttal. As
noted by one commentator, a lawyer's failure to produce the most effective
expert witness possible "could even result in a malpractice suit for failure to
perform to the generally accepted level of competence of the legal
profession.""0 3
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING SAFEGUARDS
Although trial judges have both the obligation and the necessary
instruments to control biased expert testimony, they have historically preferred
to err on the side of admission, reasoning that objections by opposing
counsel should "go to the weight" given the expert's testimony."° This "let
it all in" approach was not surprising in light of the broad discretion
afforded trial judges and the general jurisprudential rule that bias does not
preclude a witness from being qualified as an expert, but rather "is a factor
to be considered by the factfinder in deciding how much weight to give her
testimony."'"3 While the concern that a jury will attach inordinate weight to
the testimony of the biased expert has been well documented, every
indication is that the "let it all in" approach is alive and well in post-
Daubert proceedings."°
that Rowe does not "mean that every expert medical witness in every case will be subject to a subpoena
ducei tecum of unrelated medical records for the purpose of cross examination," especially where the
physician is a litigant's treating physician and not an expert retained by an opposing party shortly before
trial).
101. See La. Code Evid. art. 611.
102. Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.7, at 210. See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1425.
103. Jensen, supra note 23, at 192.
104. Veron, supra note 46, at 657.
105. Statev. Lewis, 654 So. 2d 761, 766 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995). Compare Eymard v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986):
We will turn to [the deferential standard for review] with a sharp eye, particularly in those
instances, hopefully few, where the record makes it evident that the decision to receive
expert testimony was simply tossed off to the jury under a "let it all in" philosophy. Our
message to our able trial colleagues: it is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal
trials.
106. See Weisgramv. MarleyCo., 528 U.S. 440,120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000) (holding that Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50 permits an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law when it determines
that expert evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted
evidence is insufficient to support a jury's verdict).
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A. Case Illustration: Rowe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
In Rowe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 7 the plaintiff
sought damages from his uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier for serious neck
and back injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile collision.'"8 In response to
this claim, the defendant retained the services of a physician, who subsequently
performed an independent medical examination (IME) of the plaintiff."° At trial,
the physician provided the only support for the defendant's argument that the
plaintiff's back injuries were unrelated to the accident. "0 The plaintiff's efforts to
discover and present to the jury evidence of the physician's history as an advocate
for the insurance industry were blocked by the trial court."' The jury, apparently
impressed with the physician's testimony and ignorant ofhis alleged history, did not
award damages despite testimony by Rowe's treating physicians that attributed his
injuries to the accident in question."
Rowe appealed the jury's failure to award damages, asserting manifest error as
well as error on the part of the trial judge in evidentiary rulings.' ' The third circuit
reversed, in part, the judgment of the trial court."4 Further, the court held that the
107. 670 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir.),writ denied, 673 So. 2d 611 (1996).
108. Id.at 721.
109. Id. at 722. Dr. James C. McDaniel, the physician retained by State Farm, had developed a
reputation with the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal "for testimony that often crosses the border
into advocacy." Nugent v. Continental Cas. Co., 634 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994). In
Chevalier v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), the court found that
Dr. McDaniel's "sweeping denouncement of pain clinics" reflected a "general bias against litigants."
But see Boyd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 603,606 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) ("There is no testimony
in this record by Dr. McDaniel to justify a finding of bias, certainly not to the extent that his testimony
should be disregarded.") (emphasis in original).
See also Reese v. Winn-Dixie of Louisiana, Inc., 542 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 546
So. 2d 1218, 1222 (1989) (holding that while facts disclosed in other proceedings are admissible, trial
and appellate courts' opinions as to those facts are not).
110. Rowe, 670 So. 2d at 722.
111. On appeal, the plaintiff specifically complained of the following rulings by the trial judge:
(1) the refusal to permit plaintiff to discover certain medical and financial records believed to
demonstrate the physician's close association with insurance companies in personal injury cases; (2)
the order excluding as evidence of the physician's bias the timing of defendant's motion in limine,
which sought to prevent the introduction of certain evidence pertaining to the physician's credibility
and was filed two months before the plaintiff was examined by the physician; and (3) the order
excluding the testimony of a trial attorney who had personally observed the physician's alleged
insurance advocacy in some 250 cases. Id. at 723.
112. Id.
113. Seesupra note Ill.
114. The court found no error in the jury's conclusion that the plaintiff's neck injury did not result
from the automobile accident, but rather from a separate incident some seven months later. Rowe, 670
So. 2d at 722.
The court reached a different conclusion with respect to the plaintiff's back injury, ruling that the
jury failed to take into proper account the testimony of the plaintiff's treating physicians. As stated by
the court, "[i]t is well-settled that the treating physicians' testimony will ordinarily be given greater
weight than the testimony of a physician who examines a plaintiff for diagnosis only." Id. at 723.
Finding that the causal connection between the plaintiff's back injury and the accident was legally
[Vol. 61
COMMENTS
trial judge erred in denying plaintiff the opportunity to discover and present
evidence of the expert's bias." 5 However, in finding an abuse of discretion, the
court's principal concern was not the "let it all in" approach practiced by the trial
judge, but rather the detrimental effect of the evidentiary rulings on the cross-
examination of the expert." 6 The court remained faithful to the notion that bias,
except in "extreme" cases, should not prevent a witness from testifying as an
expert." 7 In light of the court's "disposition of the merits on other grounds," a
remand to determine whether this presented an "extreme" case was not necessary."'1
Although the plaintiff in Rowe emerged victorious, the case illustrates the
danger presented by the biased expert witness." 9 In most cases, the broad
discretion afforded both the trial judge in evidentiary rulings and the jury's findings
of fact prevents disturbance of those conclusions on appeal. ' Thus, as stated by
the court in Rowe, for the litigant seeking to avoid a disappointing jury verdict, "the
importance . ..of cross-examination of a crucial expert witness cannot be
overstated."'"
B. Cross-Examination
The Rowe court is certainly not unique in the significance it
attaches to the cross-examination of the expert witness."' In fact, the
opportunity for cross-examination is realistically viewed as the driving force,
albeit unspoken, behind the "let it all in" approach."n However, despite this
established pursuant to Lucas v. Insurance Co. of North America, 342 So. 2d 591 (La. 1977), the court
awarded plaintiff $25,000 for past and future medical expenses, $250,000 for past and future mental
and physical pain and suffering, $55,707 in past lost wages, $500,000 for lost future income, and
S2,250 to plaintiff's wife for loss of consortium. Id. at 732.
115. Rowe, 670 So. 2d at 729.
116. Id. at 724.
117. Id. at 725.
118. Id. at 729.
119. This danger is not limited to personal injury plaintiffs, for defendants must often contend with
the testimony of an expert-advocate. See supra note 5.
120. See supra text accompanying note 39. See also Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.
2d 1257, 1261 (La. 1993) ('[Ain appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages..
. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could
assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiffunder the particular circumstances
that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award.").
121. Rowe, 670 So. 2d at 724.
122. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Remington Arms Co., 601 So. 2d 330, 336 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 604 So. 2d 1003 (1 992) ("The fact that a witness is a party or an employee of a party does not
preclude his qualification as an expert because the potential bias of the witness may be explored on
cross-examination.").
123. Although cross-examination can be expected to enforce honesty in testimony to some extent,
the principal formal guarantee of truthfulness is the oath. The Louisiana Code of Evidence provides
that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath
or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with
his duty to do so." La. Code Evid. art. 603. The threat of prosecution for perjury is frequently
mentioned as a safeguard against false testimony by experts. However, though it is by no means
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reliance, cross-examination often proves ineffective as a safeguard against the
expert witness.
In cross-examining a lay witness, lawyers frequently trudge back through the
witness's testimony on direct, seeking either to get the witness to admit that he made
a mistake or to frame an issue for rebuttal testimony. 4 The lawyer exercises tight
control over this process by asking leading questions to which he knows the
answers." 5 However, because of greater experience and preparation, the expert is
not as likely to be led into such a trap.26 Unlike most lay witnesses, many experts
are "repeat performers" who have gained from past experience an ability to
remain calm and focused in the midst of an attack on their opinions or credibility. 7
As a result, the expert witness usually remains consistent in his testimony, and
"searching cross-examination may not yield any result other than to provide an
opportunity for . . . [the] expert witness to repeat his already damaging
testimony. ,,..
Furthermore, the content of expert testimony presents an enormous challenge
for the cross-examiner. By definition the expert testifies to issues beyond the range
of common knowledge. If an expert gives a confusing or unexpected response to
a question, it is dangerous for the lawyer to request an explanation because it
provides the experienced expert witness with an opportunity to bolster his
credibility in the eyes of the jury. Thus the question, as deftly framed by Judge
Weinstein, becomes "[h]ow can the nonexperts control the experts?"129 Some
lawyers assert that developing a proficiency in the expert's field solves this
problem. ° But this is an expensive solution which, even when possible, is rarely
suggested that the oath is an insignificant formality, the threat of perjury is likely to prove ineffective
as a safeguard in most cases. After all, the expert usually testifies in the form of an opinion, and the
inferences that he encourages the jury to draw are typically grounded in facts not within his personal
knowledge. Thus, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
It is virtually impossible to prosecute an expert witness for perjury .... "[T]he expert is
often the hired partisan and his opinion is a response to a pecuniary stimulus. The opinion
has the sanction of an oath but lacks the substantial safeguard of truth applied to testimony
concerning facts observed by a witness which is afforded by the criminal law since the
opinion is the result of reasoning, and no one can be prosecuted for defective mental
processes. The field of medicine is not an exact science, and the expert being immune from
penalties for perjury, his opinion is too often the natural and expected result of his
employment."
Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212 (I1. 1984) (quoting Opp v. Pryor, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (III.
1920)).
124. In the context of lay witnesses, the "strongest criticism of common law cross-examination is
probably that it is too effective, that it can be used too easily to discredit truthful and accurate
testimony." Gross, supra note 36, at 1167.
125. Id. at 1165.
126. The belief that a lawyer is not likely to put words in the mouth of an expert explains
Louisiana's authorization, contrary to the Federal Rules, of leading questions on direct examination of
the expert witness. See La. Code Evid. art. 611(C); Fed. R. Evid. 611 (c).
127. Gross, supra note 36, at 1172.
128. McDowell, supra note 25, at 273.
129. Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 482 (1986).
130. See, e.g., Fitz-Gerald Ames, Sr., Modern Techniques in the Preparation and Trial of a
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achieved.' Moreover, even if such proficiency is realized, the ultimate effect of
an intellectual jousting match between the expert and the lawyer-expert is likely to
be confusion of the issues in the minds of the jury. ' From the point of view of the
cross-examiner, this may be a desirable outcome that paves the way for rebuttal
testimony. However, the resulting "battle of the experts," with all of its attendant
concerns, falls woefully short of a satisfactory resolution to Judge Weinstein's
dilemma.'
The above mentioned control problems are even more acute in the context of
the expert-advocate. In addition to the benefits of preparation and experience, an
expert with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation "knows how to Use
her position and authority to maximum effect.... ""' The cross-examiner who
seeks to attack the opinion of the biased expert does so at the risk of having it
repeated without derogation while appearing, in the eyes of the jury, to be engaged
in unwarranted harassment of the witness. Therefore, to minimize the effects of
biased expert testimony, the best course of action for opposing counsel may be to
severely limit or altogether refrain from cross-examination.'35
An impaired or unexercised safeguard provides little protection. Thus, under
a "let it all in" regime, cross-examination does not offer a satisfactory solution to
the problems presented by the biased expert. However, there has been no shortage
of proposals to compensate for the traditional abstention of trial judges from the
vigilant regulation of expert testimony. The next section considers two of the most
important and potentially far-reaching of these proposals.
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
A. Court-Appointed Experts: Louisiana Code of Evidence aricle 706
The majority of proposals to solve the problems of expert evidence involve
liberating the use of expertise from partisan selection.'36 Chief among them is the
use of neutral or court-appointed experts. Unlike other avenues of reform, this
proposal already enjoys the sanction of legislative bodies nationwide.'37 Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Suit, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 649,652-53 (1959).
131. For a discussion of the ethical concerns raised by the lawyer-expert, see Gross, supra note
36, at 1174.
132. Id. at 1174-75.
133. See supra Part l.
134. Gross, supra note 36, at 1175.
135. Id. at 1173. See also McDowell, supra note 25, at 273.
136. See Gross, supra note 36, at 1188 ("The most conspicuous dangers of adversarial expertise
are (1) that partisan choice of witnesses will produce a biased selection of experts, and (2) that partisan
corpensation and preparation will further bias the evidence that these witnesses present.").
137. Courts and commentators have often implored trial judges to exercise their authority to
appoint their own experts. See. e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579,595,
113 S. Ct. 2786,2798(1993); Stephen Brayer, The Interdependence of Science andLaw, 82 Judicature
24,26-27 (1998); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role
for Court-Appointed.Experts in Assessing Scientyc Validity, 43 Emory L. J. 995 (1994).
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has long recognized the authority of the trial judge to appoint an expert.'
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 706 supplies the general guidelines for such an
appointment. 139
In civil cases, the court may appoint an expert (or experts) either on the motion
of a party or on its own motion after giving notice to all parties.'" The court may
request the parties to submit nominations, and Article 706 encourages agreement
among them on the expert to be appointed. 4 However, the actual appointment is
committed to the court's broad discretion.142 Upon appointment, the court must
inform the expert of his duties either by a written charge or at a conference with the
parties. 143  The expert must advise the parties of his findings, be available for
deposition by any party, and testify if called by the court or by a party.'"
Should the expert testify, the court has the discretion to authorize disclosure
to the jury of the expert's court-appointed status.' 4 Finally, the court's power to
appoint an expert does not limit the parties' ability to call experts of their own
selection.'"
Despite this clear grant of authority, Louisiana judges infrequently exercise this
power. 147 Only in family law cases have courts demonstrated a degree of comfort
in employing appointed experts. 4  But family law cases are almost exclusively
In Frederick v. Woman 's Hosp. of Acadlana, 626 So. 2d 467, 474 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ
denied, 633 So. 2d 169 (1994), the court expressed the belief that appointed experts may "level the
playing field" where parties have disparate financial resources. As stated by the court, litigants may:
request under LSA-C.E. art. 706 that the trial court appoint an unbiased expert and disclose
to the jury the expert's special court-appointed status. This undenutilized provision enables
litigants of modest means to have the court use its leverage to distinguish court-appointed
neutral observers who are beyond reproach from "hired guns" retained by the highest bidder,
reducing the perceived need and advantage of litigants to hire the most (and most expensive)
experts to counter (or preempt) those that will (or might) be called by their opponents, thus
offering parties to judicial proceedings grater assurance that findings of fact are indeed
grounded on a reasonable factual basis.
Id.
138. Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Evidence in 1989, Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 192 (1960) provided: "A trial court, on its own motion or on motion of a party, may
appoint persons learned or skilled in a science, art, profession, or calling as experts to assist it in the
adjudication of any case in which their special knowledge or skill may aid the court."
139. Article 706 follows Federal Rule of Evidence 706 in civil cases. Article 706, unlike its
federal counterpart, does not provide for the compensation of the court-appointed expert. See La. Code
Civ. P. art. 192(B) ("The reasonable fees and expenses of these experts shall be taxed as costs of
court.").
140. La. Code Evid. art. 706(A).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. La. Code Evid. art. 706(B).
146. La. Code Evid. art 706(C).
147. See supra note 137. The infrequency of appointed experts is by no means unique to
Louisiana. See Gross, supra note 36, at 1190-91; Fed. I. Evid. 706 advisory committee's notes.
148. Appointments are most common in cases that require psychological or psychiatric evaluations
of litigants and/or their children See, e.g., S.T.J.v. P.M., 556 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990). See
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tried by a judge. 49 In tort cases where the trier of fact is a jury, courts rarely
appoint experts. The scarcity of appointments in this context reflects, perhaps, a
concern among judges that in appointing an expert and revealing his status they
inject judicial influence into the jury's deliberations.'-' However, in light of limited
experience nationwide, it is difficult to assess the validity of the fear that appointed
experts "acquire an aura of infallibility" in the eyes of a jury."'
A more likely, though clearly related, explanation for judicial reluctance to
appoint experts is respect for the adversarial system)5 In a survey of federal
judges, one explained that appointing experts "conflicts with my sense of the
judicial role, which is to trust the adversaries to present information and arguments.
I do not believe the judge should normally be an inquisitor."l" Indeed, the
also Ramos v. Ramos, 697 So. 2d 280 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 701 So. 2d 176 (1997) (holding
that trial court was not bound by recommendation of court-appointed expert, particularly where court-
appointed expert's recommendation indicated inadequate consideration of child's best interest).
149. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1732(3) and (4).
150. See Lee, supra note 3, at 480-8I.
151. See Fed. R. Evid. 706 advisory committee's notes.
152. Lee, supra note 3, at 496-97. See, e.g., Dixon v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 638 So. 2d 306,
316 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) ("A trial judge's only proper function during a jury trial is to act as an
impartial 'umpire' in an adversary system."). See also La. Code Civ. P. art. 1791; La. Code Evid. art.
614(D).
153. Cecil & Willging, supra note 137, at 1018-19. In the survey, eighty-one federal district court
judges were asked why they thought the authority to appoint an expert had been used so infrequently.
Id. at 1015.
In light of Louisiana's Civilian heritage, the argument may be advanced that the state's judges should
feel more comfortable than their Common Law colleagues with functioning as an "inquisitor." Civil
law courts frequently employ official experts who act, in effect, as consultants to the court rather than
as witnesses. See M. Cappelletti & J.M. Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (1965); John H. Langbein, The
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L Rev. 823, 835-41 (1985).
The consultant status of experts in Civilian courts reflects fundamental institutional differences
between the Civil Law and the Common Law. In Common Law countries, rules of procedure and
evidence contemplate trial byjury. In Civil Law countries, trial by jury is rare in criminal matters and
not used at all in civil matters. AJGM Sanders, The Characteristic Features of the Civil Law, 14
Comp. & Int'l. L J. S. Aft. 196,206 (1981). Because of its dependence on the active role of the trial
judge, the Civil Law generally "acknowledges no exclusionary rules ofevidence, particularly no hearsay
or opinion rule. In the eyes of Civil lawyers most of the grounds which under the Common Law serve
to preclude the admission of evidence merely affect the weight to be attached to a particular item of
evidence .. " Id. at 207.
Even the most cursory survey of Louisiana procedure and evidence law clearly reveals a closer
alignment with the Common Law tradition. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. art. 173 1(A) CExcept as limited
by Article 1732, the right of trial by jury is recognized."). See also La. Code Evid. art. 101 cmt. (a)
(The provisions of this Code are largely modeled after the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
of 1975."). In fact, the adversarial system is as firmly entrenched in Louisiana as it is in her sister
states. It is unreasonable, then, to assume that Louisiana judges would be more willing than their
colleagues in other states to assume a more active role in litigation. Louisiana's experience with Code
of Evidence article 706 demonstrates that this has not been the case.
But see Lee, supra note 3, at 496-97 (observing that the Anglo-American trial system has, since
the late nineteenth century, been moving closer to the inquisitorial systems ofcountries on the European
Continent, citing the practices of plea bargaining and bench trials as examples of this movement). See
also John H. Merryman, On the Convergence (andDivergence) ofthe Civil Law and the Common Law,
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adversarial system focuses inward, with fact-finding highly internalized to the
immediate litigation and litigants."M The divergent interests of opposing parties
generally result in well-prepared witnesses and a reasonably efficient
presentation of evidence. In appointing an expert, the judge brings to this system
an external actor whose preparation is not guaranteed. Moreover, in an age where
judicial resources are scarce, most judges simply cannot (or willnot) find the time
to ensure that witnesses come to court prepared."5 Thus, as observed by Professor
Gross:
[A]ppointed experts are on their own, which makes judges reluctant
to use them in all cases, and doubly reluctant to do so in jury
trials, where the formalities, the ritual, and the need for preparation
are all greatest.... [I]n a system in which expert witnesses generally
come from well managed stables, a court-appointed expert is a horse with
no rider. " 6
Not only does the appointment of experts conflict with commonly held notions
of the judicial role in an adversarial system, but in a state with an elected judiciary,
such a decision has political overtones as well.' When a lawyer seeks the office
of judge, his proclivities, whether they be plaintiff or defense oriented, may be
important factors in both his election and subsequent attempts at re-election.' In
light of the broad discretion afforded the trial judge in appointing an expert under
Article 706, a more frequent resort to this 6uthority may result in the selection of
witnesses who share the judge's personal preferences on liability.'59 Court
appointment of experts, then, has the potential to influence jury deliberations not
17 Stan. J. Int'l Stud. 357 (1981).
154. See Parker, supra note 8, at 24.
155. See Gross, supra note 36, at 1203 ("By comparison to most other countries, the legal system
in the United States includes very few judges per lawyer. As a result, a large measure of judicial
passivity is structurally inevitable.").
156. Id. at 1204.
157. Louisiana is one of thirty-nine states with an elected judiciary. In the wake of the 1998
elections, which saw the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court retain his seat upon his
opponent's withdrawal ftorn an expensive and often bitter campaign, a proposal to amend the state
constitution to provide for merit selection ofjudges surfaced in the legislature. See Ed Anderson, Bill
Would End Judicial Campaigns: Senate Panel Oks Merit Selection, Appointment by Governor, Times-
Picayune, May 5, 1999, at A2. See also Susan Finch, Cusimano Quits Court Race, Times-Picayune,
Oct. 10, 1998, at A2; Sheila Kaplan & Zoe Davidson, The Buying of the Bench. The Nation, Jan. 26,
1998, at 11.
158. See James Gill, Influencing Louisiana's Judiciary, Times-Picayune, Dec. 3, 1999, at B7:
There may be the odd campaign contributor who wants justice, but most of them are more
interested in favorable verdicts. Polls confirm that few people think judges rule with only
the law and the facts as their guide, because neither trial lawyers nor business types are
about to pay the piper and let him call his own tune. That means, at best, a prejudiced
bench, at worst a crooked one, or so the public has apparently concluded.
159. See Thomas M. Reavley & Daniel A. Petalas, A Plea for Return to Evidence Rule 702, 77
Tex. L. Rev. 493, 510 (1998) (discussing how some "activist" judges in the wake of Daubert
"misappropriate the analysis" to accommodate their preferences on liability).
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only with the prestige of the judicial office, but also with the personal bias of the
trial judge. In a system designed to resolve disputes properly limited to the interests
of the litigants, this risk is unacceptable.
Louisiana's current mechanism for the appointment of experts is devoid of
incentives to do so." Lawyers fear witnesses that they cannot control, and
therefore rarely request the court to appoint an expert. Even where one is
appointed, parties remain free to call their own experts.'' Judges hold valid
concerns as to the propriety of selecting a witness who will testify before ajury, and
therefore typically refrain from appointing experts on their own motion. In short,
appointed experts are never required, which, in light of the structure of the
adversarial system and concerns of judicial economy and impartiality, may speak
to the wisdom of Article 706 rather than to a grave deficiency. Under either view,
court appointment of experts is not an adequate response to the problems generated
by the biased expert witness.
B. Liability in Tort for Improper Expert Testimony
In light of the pressure felt by many experts to ensure future demand for their
services by way of zealous advocacy for their clients, the concern that the present
method for use of experts in court does not exert sufficient quality control on their
opinions has led some to argue that the law should provide a remedy for litigants
harmed by the improper testimony of "hired guns."' 62 Another argument is that the
threat of civil liability, in addition to compensating the injured party, "would
encourage experts to be more careful, resulting in more accurate, reliable
testimony.' 63 Nevertheless, competing public policies, including concerns as to the
willingness of experts to participate in the litigation process if they are exposed to
subsequent liability, have compelled courts to protect experts through the doctrine
of witness immunity. The remainder of this section will examine the policy
considerations on both sides of this debate to determine whether the law currently
strikes a suitable balance among them.
160. Professor Gross has formulated two very different mandatory procedures for using court-
appointed experts. See Gross, supra note 36, at 1220-30. These proposals, while theoretically sound,
entail significant changes in modem litigation practice. Legislative action is therefore unlikely without
the support of the lawyers and judges who must ultimately work with appointed experts. Such support
does not appear to be forming. See Parker, supra note 8, at 36 (Court appointment of experts grants
"external or public agents more control over the litigants' factual presentation, thereby diluting the
system of private property rights in litigative fact-finding. Given the minimal social interest in the
particular factual outcome of the litigants' case, this is likely to have a detrimental effect from a social
perspective.").
161. Because the appointed expert's fees are taxed as costs of court, a party who is dissatisfied
with the appointed expert's opinion faces increased litigation expenses should he decide to further
pursue his claim or defense. See supra note 139.
162. See, eg.. McDowell, supra note 25.
163. Carol H. Garcia, Expert Witness Malpractice: A Solution to the Problem of the Negligent
Expert Witness, 12 Miss. C. L Rev. 39,67 (1991) (quoting Brce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs
Inc., 776 P.2d 666, 670 (Wash. 1989)).
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1. Defamation and Witness Immunity
Where the consultation material prepared by the expert or his testimony at trial
includes statements that are false and cause injury to the adverse party's reputation,
the adverse party may bring an action in defamation.'" However, the expert witness
who finds himself the defendant in a defamation suit will raise the powerful defense
of absolute witness immunity, which is typically fatal to the plaintiff's claim.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains the doctrine of absolute immunity
for testimony as follows: "A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial
proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has
some relation to the proceeding."'' Under the common law, recovery was denied
even if a witness knowingly advanced false statements with malice. 1 In Briscoe
v. LaHue," the United States Supreme Court found that absolute immunity for
nonlitigant witnesses reflects an instance where "'the claims of the individual must
yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths which lead to the
ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unrestricted as possible. """ Under
these same principles, state judges have been afforded absolute immunity from
liability for theirjudicial acts, as have district attorneys for their decisions to initiate
prosecution.'" In addition to the belief that absolute immunity encourages candor
in a system designed for the "ascertainment of truth," the privilege is also deemed
consistent with the system's goal of bringing an end to the dispute between the
parties. As explained by Justice White:
The judicial process is an arena of open conflict, and in virtually every
case there is, if not always a winner, at least one loser. It is inevitable that
164. -For an excellent discussion of the Louisiana law goveming defamation, see Frank L Maraist
& Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Louisiana Tort Law 427-39 (1996).
165. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588 (1977).
166. See generally Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 332-33,103 S. Ct. at 1114 (quotingCalkins v. Summer, 13 Wis. 193,197 (1860)). The
rule of absolute immunity clearly has the potential to produce harsh results. For example, in Briscoe,
the Court considered a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damage claim against police officers for giving perjured
testimony at the criminal trials in which the petitioners were convicted. The Court held that police
officers, like all witnesses, are absolutely immune fromcivil liabilitybased on their testimony injudicial
proceedings, thereby defeating the petitioners' civil rights claims. The reasoning of the court focused
on the function of the police officer as a witness rather than his occupation and the occasion of the
judicial proceeding (a criminal trial). This "functional approach" for determining immunity was
established by the Supreme Court in Butz v. Eonomou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
169. W. PageKeeton etal., Prosser&KeetonOn the LawofTorts § 114,at816-21 (5th ed. 1984).
In Louisiana, prosecutorial immunity encompasses more than just the decision to initiate prosecution.
See Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944, 950 (La. 1996) (The court employed the "functional
approach" to immunity and found that "granting absolute immunity to prosecutors from malicious
prosecution suits is appropriate when the activities complained of fall within the scope of the
prosecutor's role as an advocate for the state and are intimately associated with the conduct of the
judicial phase of the criminal process.").
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many of those who lose will pin the blame on judges, prosecutors, or
witnesses and will bring suit against them in an effort to relitigate the
underlying conflict.
170
Without the protection of absolute immunity, witnesses "might be reluctant to come
forward to testify," and those who do may offer testimony that is "distorted by the
fear of subsequent liability.'' 11 Thus, courts generally acknowledge that the public
has an interest in obtaining expert testimony without the intimidating threat of
subsequent litigation."7
Witness immunity has been followed to some extent in all states."7 In
Bienvenu v. Angelle, 4 the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognized that
"communications made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings carry an absolute
privilege."'"7 However, in determining whether statements made by the defendant
to investigators for the Civil Service Commission carry an absolute privilege, the
court held that "[i]nvestigatory work in the field.., is not the exercise of an
adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative function, for those who are questioned are not
under oath or subject to sanctions for maling a false statement, and such
investigations are not encompassed within quasi-judicial hearings or
proceedings." 6 Communications made in the context of investigatory work "are
not accorded an absolute but only a qualified privilege."'"
170. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521-22, 105 S. Ct. 2806,2813 (1985).
171. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 103 S. Ct. at 1114.
172. Douglas R. Richmond, The Emerging Theory of Expert Witness Malpractice, 22 Cap. U. L
Rev. 693,696 (1993).
173. Keeton et al., supra note 169, § 114, at 817.
174. 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Gonzales v. Xerox Corp.,
320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975).
175. Id. at 194, 223 So. 2d at 144 ("This protection is offered in such proceedings so that the
witness, who is bound by his oath to tell the truth, may speak freely without fear of civil suit for
damages for defamation."). Decisions reported after Bienvenu assumed that the court intended the
absolute privilege to apply exclusively to the non-litigant witness. See Spellman v. Desselles, 596 So.
2d 843 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 605 So. 2d 1080 (1992); Moity v. Busch, 368 So. 2d 1134 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979). See also Calvert v. Simon, 311 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975) (finding that the
doctrine of absolute privilege is not applicable to statements made by a party in a judicial proceeding;
such statements enjoy only a qualified privilege).
Some cases prior to Bienvenu required a showing that the witness's allegedly defamatory statements
were relevant to the judicial proceeding. Once this threshold showing had been made, the witness could
invoke the absolute privilege. See, e.g., Gardemal v. McWillianm, 43 La. Ann. 454,9 So. 106,108 (La.
1891); Burke v. Ryan, 36 La. Ann. 951, 951-52 (1884). After Bienvenu, some cases mentioned the
relevancy requirement, while others did not. Compare Steed v. St. Paul's United Methodist Church,
728 So. 2d 931,941 n.6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999) (statements made by a witness in ajudicial proceeding
"where the testimony may be required and the statement is reasonably believed by the witness to be
relevant to the matter" are afforded an abholute privilege), with Hairford v. Long, 430 So. 2d 393,394
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) ('Testimony given by a non-litigant witness in a judicial proceeding carries
with it an absolute privilege.").
176. Btenvenu, 254 La. at 194,223 So. 2d at 144.
177. Id. An absolute privilege renders a defendant absolutely immune from civil liability for his
defamatory statements without any inquiry into his motives. A qualified privilege protects a defendant
from liability only if he made defamatory statements without actual malice. Black's Law Dictionary
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The language quoted above begs inquiry into the protection afforded an
expert for statements made in pre-trial consultations and reports."'t While
courts in many jurisdictions extend absolute immunity so long as the
consultations,, reports, or other support materials are prepared in
anticipation of litigation,'79 there is authority in the Louisiana jurisprudence
indicating that the privilege with respect to such statements is a qualified
one.
10
The diminished protection afforded pre-trial statements only applies, however,
to party-selected experts. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 373 provides
that an expert appointed by a trial court to assist it in the adjudication of a case is
"an officer of the court from the time of his qualification until the rendition of final
judgment in the case.'' s. In S. TJ v. P.M., 2 the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeal rendered an extensive review of modem witness immunity and
specifically addressed the immunity of court-appointed psychologists under Article
373. In affirming the dismissal of suit against the court-appointed experts, the court
stated:
[A]ppointed psychologists are non-judicial persons fulfilling quasi-
judicial functions and are classified as officers of the court with
functions intimately related to the judicial process. Hence ... they
are entitled to absolute immunity protecting them from having to
litigatd the manner in which they perform those functions. Should
they be found unprotected by such immunity, it can be envisioned
that psychologists would seek to avoid future court appointments and
1241 (6th ed. 1990).
178. InMoityv. Busch,368 So. 2d 1134 (La. App. 3dCir. 1979), the courtobserved thatan expert
witness is "free to give his opinion whether others might disagree with his conclusions or not." Id. at
1136. However, the plaintiff cited Btenvenu for the proposition that while an expert's testimony is
privileged, statements made during preparation for trial are not. The court did not reach the merits of
this argument, finding that the plaintiff did not include in his petition any allegations as to defamatory
statements made by the defendant, an expert in brick manufacture, during his preparation for trial.
179. 'See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 588 (1977). See also Middlesex Concrete Prods. &
Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 172 A.2d 22,25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 196 1) (reasoning
that if preliminary materials were not protected by absolute immunity, the expert "would be liable to
suit at the hands of his client's adversary on the theory that while the expert's testimony was privileged,
his preliminary conferences with and reports to his client were not and could form the basis of a
suit....").
180. See Oakes v. Walther, 179 La. 365, 154 So. 26 (1934) (finding that the doctor examining
plaintiff in personal injury action at request of defense counsel was protected by qualified privilege
regarding the statement in a letter to attorney that patient's mental state was abnormal); La. Atty. Gen.
Op. No. 83-818 (1983).
See also Quirk v. Mustang Eng., Inc., 143 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that physician who
performed independent medical examination (IME) on injured pipe fitter was not entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity from malpractice liability based on his opinions where he was unaware that
these opinions would be used in an adjudicatory proceeding relating to plaintiff's claim for
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act benefits).
181. La. Code Civ. P. art. 373.
182. 556 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990).
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that fear of civil liability could mar opinions and recommendations
given to the court." 3
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the court's consideration of immunity
is the broad scope of its language, which may extend beyond the context of
court-appointed experts. Proponents of the recognition of a cause of action
for parties harmed by negligent experts argue that the witness privilege is
"clearly limited to the publication of defamatory matter. It does not offer
wholesale immunity for any civil wrong."' M But neither S.TJ. nor Briscoe
v. LaHue, a case upon which the second circuit heavily relied, were
defamation actions)" Thus, it is at least possible that future litigants will
argue that S.T.J. compels the recognition of absolute immunity from all tort
liability stemming from litigation services provided by experts. On the other
hand, because the court's decision in S.TJ. was clearly grounded in the
appointed experts' "officer of the court" status, it may not reflect a
willingness to broaden the scope of immunity afforded party-selected
experts.'"M
183. Id. at 247. The immunity afforded by the court is not that of the traditional witness, but rather
that of the judge. See Williams v. Rappeport, 699 F.Supp. 501 (D. Md. 1988) (court appointed doctors
are generally entitled to the same immunity as judges).
184. Garcia, supra note 163, at 63.
185. The plaintiff in S.T.J. sought recovery of damages from a team of court-appointed
psychologists "for the tortious lois of his relationship with his son" caused by their alleged negligent
and intentional acts in an earlier custody proceeding. S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So. 2d 244,245 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1990). In Briscoe, the petitioners sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
186. Indeed, the trend emerging nationwide is to narrow rather than extend the scope of witness
immunity. Courts in three states have recognized a cause of action in negligence against "friendly"
experts who provide litigation-related services for compensation. See Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur.
Young & Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671
(Mo. 1992); Levine v. Wiss & Co., 478 A.2d 397 (N.J. 1984). The rationale has been that experts
should be held to the same standard of care in providing litigation services that would be applicable to
their other areas of practice. Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 681. The California court reasoned that if an
expert's negligence causes damage to the party who hired him, "[a]pplying the privilege in this
circumstance does not encourage witnesses to testify truthfully; indeed by shielding a negligent expert
witness from liability, it has the opposite effect." Mattco Forge, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788. In reaching
a similar conclusion, the Supreme Court of Missouri focused upon "the commercial relationship
assumed by the professional and his or her role as an advocate." Murphy, 841 S.W.2d at 682. In
Levine, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that a court-appointed appraiser, whose appointment
was agreed to by the parties to a divorce action, may be held liable for his allegedly negligent valuation
of marital property.
On the other hand, two states, Pennsylvania and Washington, have determined that friendly experts
should be afforded absolute immunity not only as to their testimony in court, but also to acts (negligent
or otherwise) and communications which occur in connection with the preparation oftestimony. Panitz
v. Behrend, 632 A.2d 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assocs. Eng'rs, 776 P.2d
666 (Wash. 1989). The Supreme Court of Washington found it "immaterial that an expert witness is
retained by a party rather than appointed by the court. The basic policy [underlying witness immunity]
of ensuring frank and objective testimony obtains regardless of how the witness comes to court."
Bruce, 776 P.2d at 669. "As a matter of law," the Bruce court added, "the expert serves the court." Id.
For a detailed discussion of these cases see Hanson, supra note 14.
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2. Negligence: Is There a Duty?
The scope of the witness privilege beyond the defamation action may be of
little consequence to parties seeking redress for an opposing expert's negligence.
While some courts have permitted negligence actions against "friendly" experts, no
state has recognized a similar cause of action for an adverse party.'"s It is generally
held that experts retained for litigation purposes do not owe professional duties to
their adversaries. This determination reflects the traditional common law rule that
economic losses cannot be recovered in tort in the absence of privity of contract.
Because an expert retained by one party has no contractual relationship with the
party's adversary, an action in negligence is thereby foreclosed.
Louisiana has traditionally taken a more flexible approach than the common
law to the duty inquiry.' Whether a duty is owed in a particular case is a question
of law.'" In Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc.,"so the Supreme Court of Louisiana
ruled that a termite inspector's duty to exercise reasonable care in obtaining and
communicating information in an inspection report extends to protect third persons,
such as the plaintiff purchasers, for whose benefit the information is supplied and
187. A possible exception here is the Texas Supreme Court's decision in James v. Brown, 637
S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1982). In James, the plaintiff brought suit against three doctors who had examined
her in the course of a judicial commitment proceeding and filed reports with the court indicating that
she was mentally ill. The suit, filed after the plaintiffsecured her release from the hospital, alleged libel,
negligent misdiagnosis, medical malpractice, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Id. at
916. The false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims were dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action. Id. at 918. The court also dismissed the libel claim based upon the doctrine of absolute
witness immunity. Id. at 917. However, the court expressly rejected a blanket immunity from all civil
liability: "While the doctors' communications to the court of their diagnoses of [the plaintiffs) mental
condition, regardless of how negligently made, cannot serve as the basis for a defamation action, the
diagnoses themselves may be actionable on other grounds." Id. The court explained that the plaintiff
was not prevented from recovering from the doctors for negligent misdiagnosis-medical malpractice
simply because the diagnoses were later communicated to a court in a commitment proceeding. Id. The
court then determined that a Texas statute that provided immunity to persons who perform, without
negligence, examinations and other acts required by the Texas Mental Health Code imposed a duty on
the defendant doctors to "exercise that degree of skill ordinarily employed under similar circumstances
by similar specialists in the field." Id. at 918. In the absence of this statutory duty of care, it is unclear
whether the court would have allowed the negligence action to proceed. See Douglas F. Pahl,Absolute
ImmuniryfortheNegligent Expert Witness: Bruce v. Byme-Stevens, 26 Willamette L Rev. 1051,1070
(1990).
188. See, e.g., Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007, 1014 (La. 1993) ("Louisiana
is a jurisdiction which allows recovery in tort for purely economic loss caused by negligent
misrepresentation where privity of contract is absent.").
189. Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 provides, in part, "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." "In determining whether article
2315 contemplates the existence of a particularly undefined duty, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
looked to the foreseeability of the risks involved as well as 'policy considerations, including social,
moral and economic elements." Green v. Walker, 910 F.2d 291,295 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Lejeune
v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 568 (La. 1990)).
190. 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993).
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who may detrimentally rely on its contents and thereby suffer economic loss. 9 '
Thus, although there was no privity of contract, the defendant's knowledge that the
plaintiffs would rely on the report in deciding whether to purchase the inspected
house "made the magnitude of their loss a foreseeable probability. The obligation
for the liability is imposed by law based upon policy considerations due to the
tortfeasor's knowledge of the prospective use of the information which expands the
bounds of his duty of reasonable care to encompass the intended user."1
The reliance interest of the plaintiffs that was crucial to the court's recognition
of a cause of action in negligent misrepresentation in Barrie presents a problem to
an adverse party seeking remedial action for alleged economic loss caused by the
biased expert. In the confines of adversarial litigation, battle lines are clearly
drawn. A party retains an expert and bears the associated cost because he believes,
on the basis of private self-interest, that doing so will improve his chances of
success on the merits.'93 The adverse party undoubtedly takes notice of the
retention of an expert by his opponent, and is then left to determine how to best
allocate his resources, which may include contracting for the services of his own
expert.' " In the midst of this polarity, it seems unreasonable, at first blush, for
either of the parties to rely on an expert associated with his adversary.
It should not be unreasonable, however, for a litigant to expect an adverse
expert witness to observe the same standard of care applicable outside the context
of litigation services. This argument lends support to an emerging exception to the
"no duty" rule concerning the physician who performs an independent medical
examination (IME). Unlike most other experts who testify at trials, the physician
who performs an IME has first-hand interaction with an adverse party. Though the
party is probably aware that the examiner is not his doctor per se, the esteem in
which society generally holds members of the medical profession may foster the
expectation of a sound and unbiased opinion.
If a physician fails to report the findings of an IME in a manner that accurately
reflects the condition of the examinee, it is foreseeable that the examinee will be
harmed. Harm in this context could either be economiC, as in cases where an
erroneous opinion compels a jury to deny recovery, or physical, as in cases where
the physician discovers a serious threat to the examinee's health and fails to warn
him accordingly. Examinees who suffered such harm, however, were traditionally
precluded from bringing malpractice claims against the physician. The Maryland
case of Hoover v. Williamson'95 is instructive on the general rule:
[O]rdinarily recovery for malpractice or negligence against a doctor is
allowed only where there is a relationship of doctor and patient as a result
of a contract, express or implied, that the doctor will treat the patient with
191. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 164, at 122.
192. Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1016.
193. Parker, supra note 8, at 33.
194. Id. However, a party's resources may be so limited that the retention of a rebuttal expert
witness is not feasible. See supra note 40.
195. 203 A.2d 861 (Md. 1964).
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proper professional skill and the patient will pay for such treatment, and
there has been a breach of professional duty to the patient."'
The rule provides, in essence, that there is no duty in the absence of a doctor/patient
relationship. Louisiana courts, perhaps sensing the potential injustices of this
bright-line rule, have challenged the traditional notion of what qonstitutes a
doctor/patient relationship.
In Green v. Walker,'97 the U.S. Fifth Circuit considered whether a physician
hired by an employer owed a duty to an employee to perform an employment
examination "with due care, consistent with the medical skills he held out to the
public, and to report his findings, particularly any finding which appeared to pose
a threat to the physical or mental health" of the employee. " Applying Louisiana
law, the court resolved this question affrmatively, holding:
[W]hen an individual is required, as a condition of future or continued
employment, to submit to a medical examination, that examination creates
a relationship between the examining physician and the examinee, at least
to the extent of the tests conducted.... To impose a duty upon the doctor
who performs such tests to do so in accordance with the degree of care
expected of his/her profession for the benefit of the employee-examinee,
as well as the employer, is fully consistent with the very essence of Civil
Code article 2315.'"
In Pena v. Fann,0" the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, relying heavily
on Green, recognized that a similar relationship forms in the course of an WvE.2 1
However, the duties recognized by the Green and Pena courts are limited; they
require the physician to diagnose and report his findings in a manner consistent with
the level of care observed by a reasonably prudent physician possessing and
exercising the requisite skills, and to warn the examinee of any findings that pose
196. Id. at 863 (emphasis added). The court further observed that: "it has been held that there is
not a doctor-patient relationship between: (a) a prospective or actual insured and the physician who
examines him for the insurance company; or (b) a prospective or actual employee and the doctor who
examines him for the employer." Id. As recognized by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
in Thomas v. Kenton, 425 So. 2d 396,400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), "[e]xceptions to this rule would
encompass situations where the doctor would assume, though gratuitously, to undertake to render
services which he should recognize as necessary to another's bodily safety, and leads the other in
reasonable reliance on the services to refrain from taking other protective steps, or to enter on a
dangerous course of conduct, or, where the doctor himself, even without the requisite doctor-patient
relationship, actually causes the condition complained of." But see Domak v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp.,
399 So. 2d 168 (La. 1981) (finding that if a hospital gives an employee a pre-employment examination,
the employee is entitled to rely on the expectation that she would be informed of any dangerous
condition discovered in the course of the examination). See also infra text accompanying note 199.
197. 910 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990).
198. Id. at293.
199. Id. at 296.
200. 677 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
201. In light of this "relationship," the court ruled that the Medical Malpractice Act applies, and
that the plaintifrs claim was premature for failure to submit it to a Medical Review Panel. Id. at 1094.
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an imminent danger to the examinee's physical or mental well-being.2" The danger
that inaccurate or improper findings by the physician will cause economic harm to
the examinee when used in the lawsuit that occasioned the examination may not fall
within the scope of the risks contemplated by these duties. In fact, Louisiana courts
are likely to prove hostile to the idea of negligence suits against adverse expert
witnesses in cases where the immediate physical or mental health of the opposing
party is not at issue.
As a matter of policy, courts must consider whether subjecting expert witnesses
to liability for acts of negligence will make it difficult for litigants to retain their
services. As feared by the Supreme Court of Washington, "imposing civil liability
on expert witnesses would discourage anyone who is not a full-time professional
expert from testifying. Only professional witnesses will be in a position to carry
insurance to guard against such liability."2 3 The Supreme Court of Missouri,
however, took exception to this argument, pointing out that "[p]rofessionals have
been subject to liability outside this context for many years, and they have
continued to provide these non-litigation related services."' The court further
emphasized the commercial reality of modern expert evidence: "Litigation support
services have turned into big business.... There is no reason to believe that
professionals will abandon the area of litigation support merely because they will
be held to the same standard of care applicable to their other areas of practice."205
The Missouri court advances the stronger argument; there is no indication that
experts will retreat from a profitable enterprise simply because they must perform
their services in a reasonable manner.
In the end, the structure of adversarial litigation provides the best explanation
for the likely refusal of Louisiana courts to entertain a negligence action brought by
a litigant against an adverse expert witness. Within this system, an attorney does
not owe a duty of reasonable care to the adversary of his client because such a duty
would be inconsistent with zealous advocacy.' °6 Though courts have expressed
discomfort with the advocacy role assumed by many expert witnesses, they
are typically reluctant to interfere with a litigant's efforts to present the best
202. See Id. at 1093. See alsO Maraist & Galligan, supra note 164, at 453-56.
203. Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens &Assocs. Eng'rs, 776 P.2d 666,670 (Wash. 1989). But see Garcia,
supra note 163, at 67 n.256 ("The court's fear was not well founded. There are many insurance plans
available at a nominal fee to those who provide expert testimony, whether on a full or part-time basis.").
204. Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671,681 (Mo. 1992).
205. Id. The Bruce court further argued that the threat of liability would encourage experts to take
extreme and ridiculous positions in favor of their clients in order to avoid a suit by them. The Murphy
court dismissed this argument in the "friendly" expert context, finding that liability for negligent
performance of their services would "encourage experts to be truthful and accurate." Id. In the context
of the adverse expert, any argument that the threat of suit by an opposing party would encourage the
expert to shade his testimony in favor of his adversary ignores the commercial nature of the expert's role
in the dispute. Furthermore, were experts to face liability to both friend and foe for deviations from
truth and accuracy, the end result would perhaps be a more consistent attainment of both.
206. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 164, at 121. "However, an attorney maybe liable to his
client's adversary for intentional tortious conduct, and may owe a duty to a third party beneficiary of
his contract of employment with his client." Id.
2000]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
possible case.2 " Thus, although the Barrie case illustrates that Louisiana is not
confined to the "citadel ofprivity," a litigant is not likely to allege a reliance interest
in the testimony of an opposing expert sufficient to trigger a duty of reasonable
care.
However, the Green and Pena cases stand as forceful reminders that a central
goal of tort law is to compensate an injured party when the loss can be rightfully
shifted to another. The discussion below re-examines the policy underlying witness
immunity in light of this basic goal.
3. Providing a Cause of Action: Defamation and Witness Immunity
Revisited
At the heart of any immunity from liability lies the notion that "conduct which
otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting
in furtherance of some interest of social importance... ."20 Societal policy does
not, however, exist in a vacuum. Because the decision to grant immunity involves
a balancing of conflicting interests, even the most established policy justifications
for inmunity must, at times, be re-evaluated in light of subsequent developments.
Consider, for example, the "post-modem immunities" created in recent years by the
Louisiana legislature.2'c These new immunities protect narrowly defined classes of
persons, such as members of downtown development districts,21 0 volunteer athletic
coaches,2 ' recreational land owners," and persons who gratuitously render
emergency care,2"' from certain types of liability, typically negligence and
strict liability.21 4  But these immunities do not contemplate wholesale
protection from all tort liability. The immunity is lost if the defendant's
conduct rises above negligence to some heightened level of fault such as
gross negligence or intentional tort.2"S In such cases, society's interest in
affording the individual a remedy for injury done to him outweighs its goal
of encouraging the desirable activities of the defendant. Thus, it is fair to
207. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 153.
208. Keetonetal.,supranote 169,§ 114, at 815.
209. See Frank L Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Employer's Tort Immunity: A Case
Study in Post-Modern Immunity, 57 La. L Rev. 467 (1997).
210. La. R.S. 9:2792.2 (1997).
211. La. R.S. 9:2798 (1997 and Supp. 2000).
212. La. R.S. 9:2791, 2795 (1997).
213. La. R.S. 9:2793 (1997).
214. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 209, at 468.
215. Id. at 468-69. "Gross negligence," as defined by La. R.S. 6:2(9) (Supp. 2000),
"means a reckless disregard ... or a carelessness amounting to indifference ... and involves a
substantial deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful
person under like circumstances." Conduct that constitutes gross negligence may also be termed
"willful," "wanton," or "reckless." The Supreme Court of Louisiana has suggested, however, that there
is only one type of wrongful conduct between intent and negligence. See Ambrose v. New Orleans
Police Dept. Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216 (LA. 1994). Regardless, then, of the terminology
preferred by a court, conduct that falls within this intermediate level of fault is not protected by statutory
immunity.
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say that Louisiana public policy does not favor immunity for grossly negligent or
intentional acts that cause injury to its citizens. The non-litigant witness's absolute
privilege to defame conflicts with this policy by immunizing conduct that rises to
high levels of fault. It permits the expert witness to knowingly advance false or
inaccurate testimony on behalf of his client without fear of subsequent liability to
those he may injure. This potential for abuse is only tolerable so long as the
traditional justification for the immunity remains applicable to those who claim its
protection.
Witness immunity, as it was originally conceived, "operated to shield the
witness at trial from the specter of subsequent litigation so as to encourage
the witness's participation in the judicial process and to enable the witness
to speak freely."2 6 The extension of the immunity to party-selected expert
witnesses does not advance these basic objectives. Unlike the "friends of the
court" for whom this protection was designed, modem expert witnesses
"function as professionals selling their expert services rather than as an
unbiased court servant."217  The compensation received by the expert is
sufficient to encourage participation in the judicial process. Moreover, this
pecuniary interest, when combined with the protection afforded by the absolute
privilege, seems to frustrate rather than advance the goal of ensuring truthful and
accurate testimony." 8
Furthermore, commentators have long observed that absolute immunity
is generally refused where there are no adequate safeguards to prevent abuse
of the privilege.2t 9 In Bienvenu v. Angelle, " ° the Supreme Court of Louisiana
demonstrated allegiance to this fundamental concern by refusing to accord an
absolute privilege to statements made in the course of "investigatory work in the
field," where the safeguards provided in a judicial proceeding are absent. " ' The
absence of safeguards also explains Louisiana's denial of absolute imnmunity to
experts for statements made in out-of-court reports.tm For in-court statements, the
safeguards most often addressed by courts as applicable to witness testimony are
cross-examination and criminal prosecution for perjury. While these safeguards
are adequate to prevent abuse of absolute immunity by the lay witness, the unique
216. McDowell, supra note 25, at 262.
217. Murphy v. A.A. Mathews, 841 S.W.2d 671,681 (Mo. 1992).
218. See supra Part I.
219. See, e.g., Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9
Colum. L Rev. 463, 470 (1909) ("underlying [the] whole doctrine of absolute immunity is the
conception of an alternative remedy"). See also McDowell, supra note 25, at 253-54.
220. 254 La. 182, 223 So. 2d 140 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Gonzalcs v. Xerox Corp.,
320 So. 2d 163 (La. 1975).
221. Bienvenu. 254 La. at 194-95,223 So. 2d at 144. Seesupratextaccompanyingnote 176. See
also McDowell, supra note 25, at 274 ("An absolute privilege is allowed only in 'situations in which
authorities have the power to discipline as well as strike from the record statements which exceed the
bounds of permissible conduct.") (quoting Demopolis v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 796 P.2d 426, 430
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990)).
222. Oakes v. Walther, 179 La. 365, 154 So. 26(1934). See supra note 180.
223. See supra text accompanying note 121. See also supra note 123.
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characteristics of the expert witness often render them ineffective. 4 Instead of
compensating for this ineffectiveness through active "gatekeeping," many trial
judges remain faithful to the "let it all in" philosophy.2 5 Taken together, the
balance of public policy and the inadequacy of safeguards to prevent abuse suggest
that the expert witness should be removed from the doctrine of absolute immunity.
The policies underlying witness immunity do, however, compel some measure of
protection for the expert witness. Fortunately, Louisiana's rejection of a different
absolute privilege afforded at common law provides some guidance in this area.
In Louisiana, a defamatory statement by an attorney in a judicial proceeding
enjoys only a qualified privilege, and, in order for the privilege to apply, the
statement must be relevant and made with probable cause and without malice.226
In Freeman v. Cooper,' the Supreme Court of Louisiana explained the limitation
on the privilege extended to attorneys:
Attorneys must be free to represent their clients without constant fear of
actions based on statements made in the zealous prosecution or defense of
an action. Nevertheless, the privilege granted to an attorney is not a
license to impugn the professional integrity of opposing counsel or the
reputation of a litigant or witness. " '
By a similar rationale, qualified immunity is the appropriate level of protection for
the party-selected expert witness, who, like the attorney, functions as a paid
advocate in 'a judicial proceeding.) 9
To prevail in a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a
false and defamatory statement concerning another;"3 (2) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; ' (3) fault on the part of the publisher;232 and (4)
224. See supra Parts II, IV.
225. See supra Part IV.
226. Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982).
227. Id.
228. Id. See also Sabine Tram Co. v. Jurgens, 143 La. 1092,79 So. 872,873 (1918) ("No one has
a right to deem appropriate or pertinent to an issue presented for decision in a judicial proceeding a
libelous allegation that he knows is false or that he has not just or probable cause to believe is true.").
229. See Albers v. Church of the Nazarene, 698 F.2d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Experts are
nowadays often the mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ and pay them, as much so
as the attorneys who conduct the suit.") (citing Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. L R.R., 78 N.W. 965,966
(Minn. 1899)).
230. Fitzgerald v. Tucker, 737 So. 2d 706,715 (La. 1999). A statement is defamatory if it "tends
to harm the reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the community....
Thus, a communication which contains an element of personal disgrace, dishonesty, or disrepute
undoubtedly satisfies the definition of defamatory." Id. at 716 (citations omitted). See Cangelosi v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 390 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. 1980) (considering falsity as a fifth
and separate element).
231. Fitzgerald, 737 So. 2d at 715. See Farria v. LaBonne Terrebonne of Houma, Inc., 476 So.
2d 474,475 (La. App. I st Cir. 1985) (nonprivileged communication of defamatory words to one person
other than the defamed constitutes publication).
232. Fitzgerald, 737 So. 2d at 715. The Fitzgerald court stated that a plaintiff must prove
"negligence or greater" on the part of the publisher. Id. This, however, is inconsistent with other
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resulting injury. 3 The qualified privilege would give the expert witness a prima
facie excuse for any defamatory statements made in the course of his testimony.
The protection would be lost, however, if it is proven that the expert made the
statements with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard as to their truth or falsity.' In such cases, the expert should be made to
answer for any damages suffered by an adverse party as a result of the defamatory
statements.
The burden of proof placed on the adverse party by this proposal is an onerous
one. To prove that an expert made a defamatory statement with knowledge of its
falsity or with reckless disregard of its falsity, the plaintiff will usually have to
demonstrate that the expert's conclusions were not arrived at through the proper
application of a well-founded methodology.2" In the absence of such a showing,
pronouncements of the court. See Maraist & Galligan, supra note 164, at 437.
233. Fitzgerald, 737 So. 2d at 715. "Damages from defamation are not confined to pecuniary
losses; harm to the plaintiffs reputation will support an award." Steed v. St. Paul's United Methodist
Church, 728 So. 2d 931, 940 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999). "General damages may include injury to
reputation, personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, anxiety and hurt feelings." Id. at 942.
234. In Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982), the court stated that the qualified
privilege is inapplicable in cases where a defamatory statement is made with "malice." Prior to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 1130(1964), states were free to presume malice if the defamatory statement was false. Because falsity was
also presumed, the result was a form of strict or absolute liability. In New York Times, the Court placed
First Amendment restrictions on a state's power to impose tort liability for defamation. Maraist &
Galligan, supra note 164, at 433. Specifically, the Court held that a plaintiff who is a public official
may not recover against a media defendant for defamation unless he proves "actual malice" by
"convincing clarity." Id. "Actual malice," as clarified by the "knowledge/reckless disregard"
definition, requires a showing of fault. After New York Times, state courts were left to determine the
status of the litigants (private citizen, public official/figure, or media) and whether the alleged
defamatory matter was of public or private concern. Id. at 438-39. In cases between private citizens
on matters of private concern, the First Amendment arguably may not impose any restrictions, thus
freeing the states to return to the pre-New York 7mes absolute liability standard. Id. at 439. See
Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 390 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. 1980). In using the
term "actual malice," the author suggests that a plaintiff must prove fault to a degree greater than
negligence on the part of the adverse expert witness for a defamatory statement to be actionable.
Furthermore, the actual malice requirement affords the expert the full measure of constitutional
protection as set forth in New York Times, thereby obviating a debate as to whether an expert's
testimony in court is a matter of public or private concern.
235. See supra Part III.A.2. For an exanple of a methodology that would fail a Daubert analysis,
see Saunders v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 387 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 394 So.
2d 614 (1980). Tere, the court invalidated a contract of compromise based on a mutual mistake of fact
as to the principal cause for the parties' consent. In reaching the agreement, both the claimant and the
insurer mistakenly believed that the claimant had been properly examined by a physician, when in fact
no thorough examination had occurred. The claimant did visit a physician in the insurer's medical
department. However, as recounted by the court:
The doctor's examination was strange in that he stood across the room without touching or
examining her, or asking her to remove the long-sleeved blouse which covered the egg-
shaped lump on her right arm. The doctor simply instructed her to raise her arms above her
head and asked if the movement produced pain, to which she responded affirmatively. He
then told her she had a minor muscle bruise and "should be out of difficulty in a week or
so." Relieved by the assurance of a professional medical officer, she was happy to accept
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even if the statements were proven false, the expert's'conduct would not rise to a
level of fault sufficient to deprive him of the qualified immunity. In light of the trial
judge's "gatekeeping" obligation, it seems that a plaintiff could successfully attack
an expert's methodology only in those cases where the judge should not have
admitted the testimony to begin with. In essence, the qualified privilege would
afford the expert a rebuttable presumption that his testimony was properly admitted.
The difficulty of rebutting this presumption should alleviate the fear that anything
less than an absolute privilege would result in an avalanche of litigation against
adverse expert witnesses. While some vexatious litigation is inevitable, this
concern does not outweigh the law's obligation to provide a remedy for injury
suffered by an innocent litigant as a result of the intentional or reckless conduct of
another. Furthermore, even though it would function as a safeguard of last resort,
the mere potential for liability would exert a form of quality control over expert
services similar to that provided by malpractice liability for other professional
services.u 6a
It is not suggested that this is a perfect, or even an easy solution to the problems
generated by the biased expert witness." It would, however, send a clear message
to the public that our system is working to ensure "that the truth... be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined."" s
VI. CONCLUSION
We permit experts to deliver opinion testimony in court because their education
and experience make them uniquely qualified to assist the trier of fact in its
determination of issues that draw from their respective disciplines. The biased
expert witness abuses this special status for personal gain. He is available to the
highest bidder, and conventional safeguards such as cross-examination lose their
strength when thrust against his resolve to raise his stock in the eyes of his clients.
$ 100.00 offered by the adjuster "for her troubles."
Id. at 604. Later, the claimant's pain continued and she consulted other physicians who diagnosed a
pre-existing bursitis severely aggravated by trauma. Id. at 605. The court concluded "that the parties
would not have consented to the compromise for $100.00 if the complete and accurate diagnosis had
been stated." Id.
236. Garcia, supra note 163, at 64.
237. One issue likely to arise concerns whether an expert's expression of opinion can give rise to
an action in defamation. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that an opinion cannot be defamatory
unless it imparts knowledge of facts. See Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So. 2d 378, 181 (La. 1988). See
also Mashbum v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977). However, "[a]n expert's opinion is irrelevant
unless the trier of fact could conclude from the evidence the existence of the facts upon which the
opinion is based." Maraist, supra note 10, § 11.4, at 205. Even in cases where the expert testifies in
response to a hypothetical question, the opinion is irrelevant absent the introduction of sufficient
evidence as to the existence of each fact supporting the opinion. Id. Consequently, even if the expert
does not expressly state the underlying facts, his opinion will typically impart sufficient knowledge as
to their existence to make it actionable in defamation. See id. (observing that the proponent of expert
opinion testimony will often inquire into the facts of the case on direct examination for fear that the
opinion will lack weight with the trier of fact absent such an inquiry).
238. La. Code Evid. art. 102.
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Relying on the insulation from liability afforded by the witness immunity doctrine,
an expert can advance in court an opinion to which neither he nor his colleagues
would subscribe beyond the doors of the courtroom. The protection originally
designed for "friends of the court" has been perverted for use as a litigation weapon,
with opposing parties bearing the ultimate risk upon its discharge. In short, the
undesirable conduct of the expert-advocate works to undermine public confidence
in the court system.
It is time for the system to respond. Trial judges must no longer refrain from
the vigilant regulation of expert testimony. In performing their "gatekeeping"
obligations, judges must demand that experts provide litigation services
commensurate with the same degree of professional care applicable to their other
areas of practice. In cases where a judge abdicates this responsibility in favor of a
"let it all in" approach, the law should provide a remedy in tort for an adyerse party
harmed by the incompetent testimony of a "hired gun." Society's interest in
ensuring the availability of expert testimony will not be jeopardized by requiring
expert witnesses to discharge their duties in good faith. To the contrary, society
will be better served by charging the costs associated with the biased expert witness
to the person in the superior position to prevent them: the biased expert himself.
Thus, qualified immunity is the proper measure of protection for the party-selected
expert witness. If these safeguards are properly implemented, a resort to more
problematic control mechanisms, such as court-appointed experts, will be
unnecessary.
Lawyers must also accept their role in reforming the use of expert evidence in
modem litigation. Finding an expert who will testify as he is told is not a legitimate
component of zealous advocacy. Instead, lawyers must "come to regard expert
testimony as honest work rather than prostitution-perhaps even as a form of public
service-and they, and judges, and experts may learn to act accordingly. ' 9
W. Raley Alord, IIr'
239. Gross, supra note 36, at 1232.
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